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A B S T R A C T
Since the early 1990s, building peace during and after conﬂict has been moving
away from the conference tables of diplomats to informal settings created by
local NGOs. The vast majority, if not all, of the peacebuilding policy and litera-
ture argues for strengthening local organisations as vehicles for peace. This paper
starts from the observation that there is a dire lack of organisational perspective
to the processes set into motion. Current local peacebuilding policy, we argue, is
based on analyses that are far removed from the everyday practices of the actors
engaged in peacebuilding. The paper oﬀers instead a qualitative approach that
gives central attention to the dynamics of peace organisations and the way
conﬂict is experienced in the everyday life of local people. It analyses the case of
one local women’s peace organisation : the ‘Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace ’.
Peacebuilding is done by people, and the dynamics of their organisation are
crucial for its success. The paper argues that a process approach to peace organ-
isations will enhance agencies’ eﬀorts for local peacebuilding. Such an approach
focuses on the question how actors in and around organisations give meaning to
an organisation. The paper outlines this approach, presents ﬁve central properties
of local peace organisations, and discusses what lessons can be learnt from this
perspective for the practice of peacebuilding.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since the early 1990s, building peace during and after conﬂict has been
moving away from the conference tables of diplomats to informal settings
created by local NGOs. The emphasis on local capacities for peace-
building, Track Two Diplomacy in foreign aﬀairs jargon, is said to follow
the changing nature of post-Cold War conﬂicts.1 These conﬂicts are
seen as increasingly intra-state in nature, and occur in areas where state
institutions have broken down, inﬂict violence, or form the roots on which
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people’s grievances grow. In these situations, conventional (diplomatic)
methods for building peace no longer apply, and civil society actors’ con-
tribution to conﬂict resolution appears an alternative and better channel
for peacebuilding.2
Marked by the agenda of human security, launched by the UN in 1991,
peace is increasingly deﬁned as something more than the absence of
war. The discourse emphasises the linkages between political, economic
and social aspects of development and security, and argues for an inte-
grated approach to peacebuilding. Sustainable peace has become a twin
concept to sustainable development, and entails that peace must include
conditions for the prevention of future conﬂict. A healthy civil society is
seen as both a necessary condition for and an achievement of sustainable
peacebuilding. Most, if not all, peacebuilding policy and literature argues
for strengthening local organisations as vehicles for peace.
While the international community has discovered the potential of
local peacebuilding and aims to strengthen local organisations to do the
job, we ﬁnd that there is a dire lack of organisational perspective to
the processes set in motion. Current local peacebuilding policy, as we
argue, is based on analyses that are far removed from the everyday
practices of the actors engaged in peacebuilding. What is needed is a
qualitative approach that gives central attention to dynamics of peace
organisations, and the way conﬂict is experienced in the every day life of
local people. This paper analyses the case of one local women’s peace
organisation, the ‘Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace’, and follows how
this organisation derives meaning for the actors involved, their clients in
the villages of southern Sudan, and its international supporters, bringing
out how organisational processes are interwoven with the politics of
peacebuilding.
The cases presented in the paper are based on ten months ﬁeldwork
by Mathijs van Leeuwen in 2001, and additional interviews in 2002 and
2003 as part of evaluation missions, in the context of a Disaster Studies
research programme on peacebuilding policy and practice (van Leeuwen
2004).3 From January to November 2001, he worked with the Sudanese
Women’s Voice for Peace on behalf of a Dutch Peace Organisation
(hereafter DPO), where he assisted the Nairobi management team, and
set up a training-of-trainers programme for community theatre. For
most of the time he stayed in Nairobi and Lokichoggio in the oﬃces of
SWVP, interspersed with visits to communities in southern Sudan. Six
weeks were spent in Narus. Apart from the information obtained through
working with SWVP and DPO, interviews were held with represen-
tatives of 27 international NGOs and UN organisations, 28 Sudanese
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organisations, a number of donor representatives, and above all numerous
women and men in the communities in southern Sudan. The ﬁeld report
on which the presentation is based was fed back to and approved by key
actors of DPO and SWVP in 2004 (ibid.).
O R G A N I S A T I O N S F O R P E A C E B U I L D I N G
Peacebuilding interventions have mushroomed in the last decade, with
an ever-widening range and scope of activities taken on by entities of
all kinds, including governments, the United Nations, churches and the
development community. Peacebuilding appears to mirror conﬂict in
its complexity. Present-day conﬂicts are considered complex, as denoted
in the phrase ‘Complex Political Emergency’. They have multiple and
changing causes, ﬂuctuate in intensity through time and space, and local
conﬂicts usually have international or even global dimensions. If conﬂict
is complex, peace processes are, of course, equally if not more complex.
There are multiple and changing motivations and impetus for peace.
Peacebuilding is a long-term process, often with intermittent recurrence
of violence.
When Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched the UN Agenda for Peace
in 1992, he deﬁned peacebuilding as : ‘Action to identify and support
structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid
a relapse into conﬂict. ’ Even though debate continues over whether the
term should be restricted to particular political processes (Cousens 2000),
international policy discourse on peacebuilding has become increasingly
comprehensive. Exemplary is Lewer’s (1999: 12) deﬁnition of the term as:
Non-violent processes which attempt to prevent, mitigate and transform violent
conﬂict and contribute to building societies in which people have fair access
to resources, which are based on social justice, and which respect fundamental
human rights recognised under international law. The rebuilding of benign
functional relationships is a vital part of this activity. Such processes should
be rooted within the communities aﬀected by the conﬂict and be sustainable
locally. Peacebuilding usually requires a long-term commitment from local
people and outside helpers, and can involve both cross-cutting (integrated into
development and relief programmes) and stand alone approaches, and work at
community or national levels, or both.
In this comprehensive deﬁnition, a central role is attributed to civil society.
Many researchers of conﬂict conclude on the basis of ﬁeldwork that the
support of civil society is indispensable for peacebuilding (see Anderson
1996; Prendergast 1997; Richards 1996). Numerous INGOs and UN
agencies have adopted this in their policies. Strengthening civil society
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is considered crucial both as a means of achieving peace, and as a
condition for making it last. Civil society organisations have become
the implementation arm as well as the objective of many peacebuilding
programmes.
The attention for strengthening civil society as part of peacebuilding
programmes is contested too. Mark Duﬃeld (2001) views this kind of
peacebuilding as part of a package of liberal democracy that the West
wants to export to and impose on war-torn societies. Peacebuilding
policies have also been accused of bypassing the strengthening of (local)
state structures, even where this may be more appropriate for functional
and legitimising reasons (Crowther 2001). In peacebuilding practice
the concept of civil society is often reduced to refer to NGOs. This may
be at the expense of locally more meaningful organisations like churches,
trade unions, community organisations and traditional leadership insti-
tutions (Hulme & Goodhand 2000: 21).
Our position in this debate is that building civil society is indeed crucial,
but should not be the only focus and is no panacea in itself. Local-level
peacebuilding should always be complementary to attention for nation-
level, international and global processes intertwined with the conﬂict.
Strengthening local capacities for peace is crucial because, in the ﬁrst
place, higher-level conﬂicts are always manifested locally in speciﬁc con-
ﬂicts that need to be resolved on the ground. In the second place, once
peace is established and international organisations withdraw from
the scene, one needs resilient local institutions that can absorb, alter or
resolve future tensions. However, having said that, we are convinced that
local-level peacebuilding should be grounded in the empirical analysis of
social and organisational processes. This means that we step away from
questions like what civil society ought to be and should do. Instead we
want to see how peacebuilding interventions get shaped in local realities.
People are always organising and disorganising in manifold, formal
and informal, ways. When peacebuilding organisations emerge from or
are inserted into these local realities, we want to know where they come
from, how they operate, and what determines their success or failure.
To understand how peacebuilding activities work and what they do to
enhance peace (or if they perhaps enhance conﬂict instead) requires
insight into the dynamics of organisations.
T H E M E A N I N G O F O R G A N I S A T I O N S
Existing literature on peacebuilding NGOs has several shortcomings.
It usually deals with international NGOs with their headquarters in the
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United States or Europe, sometimes without the merest reference to
NGOs in the rest of the world (e.g. Aall 1994; Anderson 2001; Voutira &
Brown 1995). In addition, it hardly bothers to identify what organisational
approach is taken. Implicitly, however, literature treats NGOs (and other
organisations) as ‘ things ’, as if there is a single answer to the questions
of what an NGO is, what it wants and what it does. There is, however,
far more to organisations than their formal objectives, structures and
activities. Since organisations are constituted by people who operate in
multiple social settings, their structure may be very diﬀerent from their
boundaries and inﬂuence in practice. NGOs present diﬀerent faces to
diﬀerent stakeholders, for instance in relating to donor representatives,
clients or colleagues. Which is the real face, or in case they are all real,
what does that mean for our understanding of these organisations and
how do we determine their impact? There are always diﬀerent ideas of
what an organisation should be among and within staﬀ, members or
other stakeholders. How do these notions compete, what role do they
play in shaping the practice of the organisation? How do the formal and
informal aspects of organisation intertwine and aﬀect its peacebuilding
activities?
To unravel these questions, we have to take on board a dynamic
approach to organisations (Hilhorst 2003). This starts by treating
organisations not as things, but as open-ended processes. Viewing organ-
isations as ‘ things’ means that one conﬂates the organisation as it is
presented – i.e. with particular objectives, a clear structure and a neat
programme – with the real organisation as it is. Under the surface of the
‘ thing’, however, one ﬁnds that organisations operate more like living
organs (changing in relation to their environment), or appear as multi-
faceted entities that cannot be captured in a single description. Organ-
isations are many ‘ things ’ at the same time (Morgan 1986). They can be
rationally organised according to an international blueprint for NGOs,
and at the same time be social networks, income-generating projects, or
arenas of competing factions. It is not clear in advance how these diﬀerent
identities coincide, interact, dominate, facilitate or divide. To explore
these tensions that are inherent in NGOs, research cannot be limited to
formal organisational features, structures and reports. Instead, it must
take into account the everyday practices of the social actors in and around
the organisation. Rather than taking organisations at face value, we have
to ask and observe how their claims and performances acquire meaning
in practice.
Our insistence on the importance of taking into account everyday
practices in organisations is theoretically founded on an actor orientation.
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Such orientation starts with the premise that social actors have agency
(Giddens 1984; Long 1992). They reﬂect upon their experiences and
what happens around them, and use their knowledge and capabilities to
interpret and respond to development. An actor orientation implies
that gauging why and how organisations come about and operate in the
context of local and global developments requires studying their everyday
practices. We must follow how actors deﬁne the situation, chose their goals
and ﬁnd room for manoeuvre to realise projects. We must try to make
sense of people’s motivations, ideas and activities by taking into account
their past and present surroundings, social networks and histories. And
we must observe the way they implement their activities, because this
conveys practical knowledge, implicit interpretations, and power processes
taking place in and around organisations.
The following cases discuss how Sudanese NGOs, community organ-
isations and international organisations deal with peacebuilding processes
in southern Sudan. We start with an introduction to the context of war
and peacebuilding in Sudan, and discuss the growing attention of inter-
national organisations for the role Sudanese civil society could play in
building peace. We then discuss the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace
(SWVP), an organisation that moved from a membership organisation
to a women’s movement to an NGO. The second case concerns one of
the local women groups aﬃliated to SWVP. Both cases reveal how those
organisations represented themselves as peace organisations, how their
claims and performances acquired meaning in practice, and how they
were shaped by their internal relations and the dynamics in their sur-
roundings. In the ﬁnal section of the paper we elaborate what this means
for understanding peacebuilding organisations.
C I V I L S O C I E T Y I N C O N F L I C T : T H E C A S E O F S U D A N
Conﬂict in Sudan concerns the interplay of many conﬂicts that are
manifested diﬀerently through time, space and scale. For more than
40 years a civil war between the government of Sudan in Khartoum and
armed opposition movements has ravaged Sudan. While the southern
resistance movement SPLA/M aimed to bring down the central govern-
ment, factionalism within the insurgency resulted in regional conﬂicts
between rebel militias. At the local level, this has inﬂamed or intensiﬁed
local conﬂicts, fuelled by the widespread availability of light weapons,
including inter-ethnic conﬂicts and conﬂicts over resources such as
land and cattle ; conﬂicts between communities and between displaced
and local populations (Pax Christi 1999). Hence, conﬂict in Sudan ranged
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from attacks by government helicopter-gunships killing up to a hundred
villagers at a time, to ﬁghts and occasional deaths resulting from local
cattle-raiding.
The last ten years have witnessed a series of international diplomatic
interventions to address the North–South conﬂict. Prominent were
the eﬀorts under the aegis of IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development). Diﬃcult issues in the negotiations were the principle
of separation between state and religion, the right to self-determination of
southern Sudan and other marginalised areas, the boundaries of southern
Sudan, and the entitlement to the oilﬁelds located in the border zone
between the North and the South (for the latter issue see Verney 1999).
Early in 2002, the two major factions in the South, SPLM (Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement) and SPDF (Sudan People’s Defence Force),
merged forces. This was followed by a ceaseﬁre agreement between the
Sudanese government and the SPLA, and the starting of peace talks in
Kenya, under the auspices of IGAD. In 2004 a peace deal was signed,
which was formalised early in 2005, by which time an insurgency in the
western region of Darfur had turned into a new human tragedy.
Civil society in southern Sudan
Southern Sudan has a rich tradition of conﬂict resolution at the local
level. Prendergast (1997: 80-2) gives several examples of how elders from
diﬀerent cattle-keeping communities in the border area between northern
and southern Sudan were able to negotiate peaceful movement for the
northern groups into the southern grazing areas, and of reconciliation
eﬀorts by Dinka and Nuer chiefs in 1993, as a response to inter-militia
ﬁghting. Several agreements have been reached between cattle-keeping
groups in the border area of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, as a result of
combined eﬀorts of army commanders and elders. These traditional
governance structures have been severely eroded by population displace-
ment, the power of the rebel armies and the large-scale conﬂicts in the
region. In many areas their roles have been taken over by young rebel
leaders, often sons of the elders. Nonetheless, traditional structures are
still very important for local peace. In Narus (see below), the local army
commander strongly relied on the local elders to bring peace between
the Toposa and the SPLA.
Churches4 are the most locally present institutions in southern Sudan,
and have played an important role in most initiatives for local peace.
The Presbyterian Church, for example, sponsored travelling peace com-
mittees in Upper Nile (Prendergast 1997: 27). The New Sudan Council
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of Churches (NSCC, comprising Catholic and Protestant churches in
southern Sudan) initiated the People to People Peace Process (often
referred to as ‘4Ps’) ; 4Ps consisted of a series of grass-roots peace and
reconciliation conferences which started in Wunlit (Bahr el Ghazal) in
early 1999. The conferences brought together traditional leaders, church
leaders and community representatives, and resulted in an agreement
for peace between Dinka and Nuer communities (OLS/UNICEF 2000).
The conferences addressed and involved the eﬀective authorities, i.e.
the rebel movements, whose collaboration was a major condition for
success. This strategy, however, also compromised NSCC in the eyes of
some international donors, who came to believe that NSCC was aﬃliated
to the SPLA/M.
Modern civil society organisations are a recent phenomenon in south-
ern Sudan. Over the ten years to 2001, an estimated 65 organisations
were formed, mostly in the format of an NGO.5 Most have their main
oﬃce in Kenya or Uganda, and are established by Sudanese in exile. Most
work in relief, and many of these have secondary objectives regarding
peacebuilding. A few work primarily and actively on peace at the local
level. Peacebuilding includes activities such as social healing, promoting
dialogue and reconciliation, monitoring human rights violations, or the
promotion of participatory government. Part of the work consists of the
formation of community based organisations – in particular women and
youth groups – in the communities.
The recent emergence of modern civil society organisations has to
be understood in the context that until very recently institutional space
for civil society initiatives was limited. Neither the colonial authorities
nor the post-independence government were interested in the social,
political and economical development of the South. The rebel move-
ments were initially organised in strict top-down fashion. They did
nothing to establish civil authority structures or to encourage civil
society organisations. Internal discussion and occasional protest from
local populations about the lack of engagement of the rebels with non-
military people and institutions led to an SPLA convention in 1994,
stating the resolution to build civil structures (see Lesch 1998; SPLM
2000). Since then, new administrative structures have been set up in
several areas. The roles and responsibilities of army, civil adminis-
tration, traditional leaders and civil society have been stipulated by the
SPLM, but still need to gain empirical reality. Their establishment is
hampered by the de facto resistance of local military commanders,
little grasp of the division of responsibilities, and a lack of experience
of oﬃce bearers, who often have a military past. A situation has thus
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emerged where – not uncommon in conﬂict situations – civil authority
structures and civil society have to be developed simultaneously.
Many Sudanese and international organisations implicitly struggled
with the questions of which road to take, or on which of the two to
work at all.
( I N T E R N A T I O N A L ) O R G A N I S A T I O N S S T R E N G T H E N I N G
S U D A N E S E C I V I L S O C I E T Y
The humanitarian operation in southern Sudan is one of the longest in
history, and since the mid 1990s UN organisations and INGOs have
adopted the idea that relief must be made relevant to development
and peacebuilding. Although diﬀerent approaches can be discerned,
international organisations consider that an orientation to development
and peace requires investing in capacity building of local authorities and
civil society organisations. The question is whether and how they can
do this.
Development and/or peace?
The SPLM (2000) maintains a policy of ‘peace through development ’,
and this is also the strategy of many international organisations. The
strategy aims to integrate the development of civil authorities and civil
society with the provision of services. It is based on the notion that the
root cause of local conﬂicts is often found in competition over resources.
Hence, by providing additional resources and services, such as water
points, conﬂict will be prevented or resolved. Most international organ-
isations approach peacebuilding through development, although they
ﬁnd this diﬃcult to realise in practice, with the capacity building com-
ponents often lagging seriously behind. Both international and local
NGOs have built expertise in the provision of services and much less in
capacity building. A major problem is, of course, whether development
projects that are not sustained with capacity building will still have a
positive impact for peace. Unbalanced development is known to exacer-
bate conﬂict, and many conﬂicts require a political solution and not
merely an investment in development. Several INGOs approach peace-
building more directly. They focus for instance on training in conﬂict
handling, the support of peace conferences, or the assistance of local
women groups. In practice, there is not so much scope for direct peace
work, because many local authorities and civil organisations are con-
cerned that these activities are too political.
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Strengthening civil authorities and/or civil society?
To organise relief, international organisations have always had to work
with the authorities of the rebel movements and their humanitarian oﬃces
(such as the SPLA/M related SRRA). However, most organisations
refrained from capacity building for the emerging civic authorities that
were installed by the rebel movements, especially when the rival rebel
movements were still active. International organisations were worried
about compromising their image of neutrality by working with groups
that could be considered party to conﬂict (Macrae et al. 1997). Slowly, some
organisations became convinced that capacity building of the movement
was necessary to upscale peacebuilding and development eﬀorts. USAID
and UNICEF, for instance, launched the STAR (Sudan Transitional
Assistance for Rehabilitation) programme, to develop local authorities in
rebel-held territories.
Investing in capacity building of local organisations?
The rhetoric on civil society notwithstanding, many international organ-
isations were hesitant to invest in the capacity building of Sudanese
NGOs. Many questioned the independence of NGOs, which were con-
sidered to be one way or the other linked to the rebel movements. Besides,
questions abounded about the genuineness, democratic organisation
and accountability of Nairobi-based Sudanese NGOs whose numbers had
mushroomed in just a couple of years, partly because of the ﬁnancial
opportunities that had presented themselves in the wake of the relief
operations. The problem of trust was exacerbated because NGOs, operat-
ing in a competitive ﬁeld, often accused each other of linkages to the rebel
movements or corrupt practices.
With the obvious exception of church-related INGOs, INGOs rarely
considered encouraging development and peace by strengthening the
capacities of church-related programmes, even though churches are
the oldest civil society organisations and have the largest outreach and
legitimacy in southern Sudan. There are some indications that INGOs
had little conﬁdence in church-related initiatives, which they suspected
to be too much integrated with rebel movements. Instead of supporting
existing structures of Sudanese NGOs or churches, most INGOs con-
centrated their capacity building eﬀorts on creating Community Based
Organisations in Sudan.
International organisations have thus taken on policies to strengthen
local capacities, but found it diﬃcult to put these into practice. Those
organisations that do support local organisations, as we shall see below,
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ﬁnd indeed that it is a complicated process. Most organisations shy away
from supporting existing organisations because of anecdotal evidence
suggesting these do not ﬁt into preconceived conditions about ‘civil
society ’ and ‘ local organisations ’. Many of these organisations decide to
by-pass supra-local structures and directly invest in organisation building
at village level. Notwithstanding the question of whether local organisation
building will meet the same complications, it should be asked whether
such a strategy is sustainable.
T H E S U D A N E S E W O M E N V O I C E F O R P E A C E
Since the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, there has
been growing attention to the contribution of women in peacebuilding.
This was also apparent in Sudan, where international organisations
developed a strong discourse on gender and peace. Among the emerging
women for peace initiatives were several initiatives to give women a more
active voice in the IGAD. Amongst others, this was done through the
‘engendering the peace’ project, which was initiated by the Netherlands
Embassy to bring women to the negotiating tables and grew into a separate
organisation. Although these women were partly successful in participat-
ing in IGAD, it was generally felt that their inﬂuence was marginal,
amongst other things because they felt they were not taken seriously by
the SPLA/M (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen forthcoming). Most attention was
given to the potential of women to build peace at the local level. The
following case concerns what was for some time the most prominent
women’s organisation in southern Sudan: the Sudanese Women’s Voice
for Peace (SWVP). The narrative follows how the organisation evolved
and changed in the interplay with its international supporters.
SWVP was born out of a meeting organised by an East African NGO,
the People for Peace in Africa. When peace negotiations between southern
rebel factions continued to fail, this organisation considered in 1993 that
the wives of factional leaders could perhaps inﬂuence their husbands’
opinions. A meeting was organised for the wives of signiﬁcant political
leaders. After a tumultuous start when a Nasir woman was physically
attacked in the street outside the workshop venue, creating an instant
conﬂict among the delegates, the workshop was nonetheless successful.
The women decided to form an organisation promoting the interests
of women. They did not want to engage in politics, which they wanted to
leave to their husbands.
The Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace (SWVP) started in 1994 with
the intention of uniting southern Sudanese women of diﬀerent ethnic
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groups and religions. SWVP wanted to accomplish ‘what men have failed
to achieve’ : peace in Sudan. SWVP emphasised the central role of women
in the resolution of conﬂict. According to the founders, women as mothers
are united in their desire not to see their sons killed in conﬂict. Besides,
they consider they have more interest in peace, because they suﬀer
more from war than men do. Finally, they were convinced that women
by their innate character and by traditional heritage are natural peace-
makers. The initial membership of SWVP consisted of wives of political
leaders, and women who had become active in organisations and peace-
building initiatives. Their ethnic origins were diverse, they were generally
educated, and all lived in exile in Nairobi. SWVP thus started as a
membership organisation in Nairobi that, due to its ethnic diversity, could
claim to represent southern Sudanese women in peacebuilding processes.
At the same time, they considered their group as the seed of a southern
Sudan-wide women’s movement for peace.
In the ﬁrst year SWVP organised several public events to call atten-
tion to the plight of women and children in the war. They were able to
get modest support, from bishops and UNIFEM, for membership train-
ing and a visit to southern Sudan for a workshop and to introduce the
SWVP to the military command in the area. Within one year, after
having had just one activity in southern Sudan, the organisation was
launched internationally. A delegation of SWVP was invited to attend
the Conference in Beijing, where they were exposed to international
discourses on women and peace. Beijing furthered the visibility of SWVP,
resulting in international support in the form of training, funding for
activities and invitations to international events. Immediately after the
initiation of SWVP, the organisation thus became discursively and organ-
isationally intertwined with the international community working for
Sudan.
In the ﬁve years following Beijing, SWVP started to move from a city-
based membership organisation to a countrywide women’s movement.
The Nairobi members received training in conﬂict resolution and civic
education, after which they trained and organised women’s groups in
ten communities of southern Sudan. SWVP facilitated workshops for
peacebuilding and human rights advocacy, and for trauma counselling.
Some of these were facilitated by international experts, ﬂown in for the
occasion. The Nairobi women started to present themselves as a chapter
of a countrywide movement, even though the movement had not
materialised in a formal sense and the groups had never had the
opportunity to meet together. The Nairobi ‘chapter ’ had grown by this
time to about 90 members.
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Among the international supporters of SWVP was DPO, a Dutch
peace organisation, which assisted ﬁnding ﬁnancial assistance in the
Netherlands, facilitated some SWVP activities in the ﬁeld, and included
the case of Sudanese women in their European peace advocacy cam-
paigns. In the course of time, SWVP and DPO visualised ‘Seeds for
Peace’. This programme aimed to empower local women to participate
in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding at the local and regional level.
Part of the programme was the establishment of four regional ‘Peace
Demonstration Centres ’ that would function as focal points for awareness
raising, training, and income generating activities. The programme was
facilitated by DPO and SWVP, and ﬁnanced by the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Aﬀairs. To take on the programme, SWVP had to register as
an NGO, thereby transforming it into a service organisation for the local
women groups in southern Sudan. This change in organisational identity
signalled several problems.
Organisational problems
With Seeds for Peace, SWVP transformed itself from a voluntary organ-
isation to an organisation with a few salaried members. It also changed
from a ﬂat organisation into one with specialised and diﬀerentiated func-
tions. A ﬁnal major change was that the budget of SWVP became much
larger. This resulted in a number of organisational problems. Since only
a few women received a salary, the other members of SWVP grumbled
about the lack of fair recruitment procedures and started to reassess their
willingness to work for SWVP as volunteers. The revision of tasks was
little discussed and clariﬁed, and led to all kinds of problems in the
everyday division of responsibilities.
Though a few of the women had experience with working in (inter-
national) NGOs, they lacked experience in project planning and budget-
ing. SWVP’s donors tried to remedy these problems by hiring consultants
to improve the management and ﬁnancial administration, but programme
reporting and bookkeeping continued to lag seriously behind. The avail-
ability of relatively large funds put relations with the local ‘chapters ’ of
SWVP under strain. It raised unrealistic expectations, and stories about
the possible misuse of funds by the Nairobi women started to circulate.
Interpersonal problems
The organisational problems stemming from Seeds for Peace exacer-
bated a number of problems between the women that had been
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building up over previous years. Many SWVP women had undergone
traumatic war experience and SWVP work was at times very stressful,
especially in the ﬁeld. This contributed to the fact that the women found
it diﬃcult to maintain good personal relations. The only experience
SWVP women had with management was in military-style environments,
and their authoritarian management style left little space to express dis-
comfort about the state of aﬀairs and resolve internal problems. Instead,
an atmosphere of suspicion and gossip arose. This was made worse by
the political chicanery surrounding peace organisations in a country at
war. SWVP was vulnerable to the pull of political powers who wanted
to co-opt its resources. Fearing such complications, the leaders of
SWVP were very secretive about the organisation’s resources, which in
turn led to the wildest speculations within and around the organisation.
A core group of women emerged who trusted each other, partly because
they came from the same area and shared the same background. This
had the unfortunate consequence that, when more and more women
outside the ‘ trust group’ left the organisation, SWVP lost its multiethnic
character.
Donor relations
Another set of problems emerged in relations with and between
donors. DPO is a Dutch church-related peace organisation that combined
supporting local peace initiatives with lobbying activities in Europe for
resumption of peace negotiations between the North and the South, and
against oil companies’ war-fuelling purchases of Sudanese oil. Its simul-
taneous involvement with local organisations helped to inspire and dignify
its lobbying work. At the start, relations between DPO and SWVP were
cordial, though not equal. DPO considered its relationship with SWVP
as one of partnership and trust. SWVP valued the relationship with DPO,
as one of its most consistent supporters. At the same time, they maintained
relationships with other donors, using the competition that had unmis-
takably evolved among donors over this prominent women’s organisation
to their own advantage.
Seeds for Peace thoroughly changed the relationship between SWVP
and DPO. Money from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs was
administered by DPO, and as a result, DPO became more of a donor
than an equal partner. DPO had to ensure that SWVP followed the
funding conditions, which was perceived by the SWVP women as
interference in their internal aﬀairs. The DPO representative, on the
other hand, gradually lost her conﬁdence in the trustworthiness of the
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women in Nairobi. Her intensive eﬀorts to request, facilitate and
eventually demand increased accountability and more visible activities in
southern Sudan were not given substantial response. Finally, in the
summer of 2002, DPO severed its ties with the Nairobi women of
SWVP, and started to look for other channels to support peacebuilding
in southern Sudan.
The problems experienced by SWVP were not entirely organisational.
Working in conﬂict is subject to many practical and political constraints.
Visiting the areas in southern Sudan is highly expensive and at times
dangerous. Co-operation with the resistance movements and their
humanitarian wings on the ground was not always easy, with SWVP
representatives sometimes being suspected of fuelling tensions, or local
oﬃcials interfering with its work. Nor, however, can what happened to
women’s peacebuilding be understood without taking into account the
organisational dynamics in SWVP. The partly donor-driven transitions
SWVP went through, from membership organisation to social movement
to NGO, took their toll to the extent of jeopardising the entire organ-
isation. In 2002, the many diﬃculties surrounding SWVP had given the
organisation a very bad reputation. Rightly or wrongly, in the eyes of
many bystanders, they had moved from an icon of hope for peace to a
bunch of quarrelling women.
W O M E N’ S P E A C E D E M O N S T R A T I O N C E N T R E I N N A R U S
Before thinking through some of the implications of the SWVP story, let
us discuss a second case. This consists of a local organisation aﬃliated
to SWVP: the Peace Demonstration Centre in Narus.
Lifeworld and everyday conﬂict
Narus is located just over Sudan’s border with Kenya in SPLM/A-held
territory. Its population of about 8,000 consists of a majority of Dinka, a
large number of Toposa (originating from the region), and smaller groups
of displaced Equatorians, Nuba and Nuer. Narus has been hit several
times by bombardments of the Sudanese army, and experiences diﬀerent
kinds of local conﬂict. Tension and suspicion between Toposa and Dinka
has built up from the past when the (Dinka-dominated) SPLA occupied
the area and forcibly recruited soldiers. Many Dinka soldiers settled in
Narus and started occupying land. The resulting tension permeated
the entire fabric of community life, resulting in a general ‘culture of
suspicion’.
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Another source of local conﬂict is cattle-raiding and related violence.
The people living in the area have a tradition of cattle-raiding, which is
related to cultural institutions surrounding bride-wealth and masculinity.
With the increasing availability of guns, cattle-raiding has become a
deadly and escalating practice. According to many people, the insecurity
and high levels of domestic violence in Narus partly resulted from the
wide availability of alcohol. The relation between alcohol and local
conﬂict is complicated, because the production of alcohol is at the same
time one of the few income-earning opportunities available to women.
An important local dimension of peace in Narus is the bishop of the
Diocese of Torit. He was involved in reconciliation agreements between
chiefs of diﬀerent cattle-raiding groups.
Dreams and realities of a peace demonstration centre
The women group of SWVP in Narus started in 1997, with 15 participants
from all major ethnic groups in Narus. SWVP-Narus set out to contribute
to resolving local conﬂict. In 1998, for instance, they stopped the escalation
of a ﬁght between Dinka and Equatorians. In these conﬂicts, the women
were not centre-stage actors, but played an important role in early
warning and mobilising the appropriate authorities (Simonse 1999). The
women of Narus soon wanted to extend their peacebuilding to surround-
ing communities, for which they wanted to build an oﬃce and compound
where they could meet, receive and train visitors. To sustain the centre, it
would include a shop and a tailoring workplace. When the centre never
materialised, due to constraints to be discussed below, the women’s group
started to change. The women still wanted to address local conﬂict, but in
addition the group turned more and more into a social, mutual support
network. They had a monthly bible sharing after church, made home
visits or went to the dispensary when a member or her child was ill, cooked
together for the church, attended funeral rites, and collected money for
needy people. Several of these activities were continuations of pre-SWVP
social life, now headed under the label of SWVP. Apart from activities
organised by outsiders, in particular the SWVP-Nairobi, there were no
formal meetings. This had implications for the ethnic composition of
the group. SWVP-Narus had come to operate as a social network, mainly
of Toposa women. Only when oﬃcial activities took place, with SWVP-
Nairobi, did they invite other members. As a result, the women outside
this network felt increasingly alienated from SWVP-Narus, and developed
more comfortable relations with other (I)NGO initiatives for women that
were ongoing in the area.
552 D. H I L HOR S T AND M. V AN L E E UWEN
Dynamics in SWVP-Narus
An important constraint on the development of the peace demonstration
centre was that it lacked the necessary resources and capacities, and
supportive institutional environment. Most of the Narus women had to
balance their activities for SWVP with taking care of children, and making
a living through cross-border trade and participating in NGO projects,
while often their husbands were absent. They had few resources to bring
to the centre, and actually hoped that it would serve them as a future
source of income. When this prospect faded, many of them lost interest
and left. Another problem was that the skills to run projects and the
organisational capacities of the group were limited, with for example
only 3 out of 20 women capable of writing. SWVP Nairobi was a distant
supporter that could not train the women in the daily running of an
organisation. A major constraint was the lack of co-ordination between
aid organisations at the local level. A number of churches, international
and local NGOs in Narus provided income generating activities.
Groups of women were loosely organised around such initiatives. Instead
of collaborating or assisting the SWVP women’s group, these preferred
to bind individual women to their own initiatives.
The meaning of peace
How signiﬁcant is SWVP-Narus for peace? This depends, of course, on
how one deﬁnes peace and what expectations exist about peacebuilding.
The Narus women were convinced that their activities were leading to a
more peaceful society. They developed a deﬁnition of peace that started
from below, from the unity of the core-family, and primarily worked on
‘peace among ourselves ’, by cultivating peace in their families and homes.
Besides, they considered development as an important prerequisite for
peace. As they claimed, ‘you cannot have peace in your mind without
peace in your stomach’. They therefore considered their participation in
income generating projects also as peace work. They maintained this
mission as advocates for peace in the wider context of Sudan. As SWVP,
they were often invited to other organisations’ peace activities, where
they could bring out their message for peace. Otherwise, they saw little
opportunity to translate their mission into concrete activities. The North–
South conﬂict and the bombardments were clearly beyond their realm
of inﬂuence. Since most of their members were not from cattle-holding
families, they also saw little scope in addressing cattle-raiding. Addressing
alcohol-related violence, on the other hand, found no constituency in the
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group because many of the Peace Demonstration Centre women brewed
alcohol to earn an income.
The question is whether the signiﬁcance of SWVP-Narus can only
be read from its peace related activities. Clearly, for the women who
constituted the organisation, peace (in a strict sense) was important, but
did not have the overwhelming priority outsiders attribute to it. They
were primarily occupied with the demands of making a living, and
driven by the desire to realise good community relations in a more
general sense. The group was very important for the identity and social
relations of the women members, who found in it a venue in which to
share the hardships of life with likeminded women. The concern of
outsiders that SWVP-Narus lost credibility as a peacebuilding organ-
isation because it had largely lost its multiethnic character was not
shared by the women. The ethnic composition of the group seemed, in
their perception, to present no barrier whatsoever to continuing their
peace work.
Finally, we should mention the symbolic signiﬁcance of groups like
SWVP-Narus. Through their work, the concept of peace entered the
everyday vocabulary of people in the community, which contributed to
a slowly growing constituency for peace. This eﬀect radiated far beyond
their immediate activities. The fact that these women belonged to a
larger women’s movement for peace was widely known, and appealed to
many men and women in and outside of Narus. We fully agree with
Cynthia Cockburn (2000: 25), who concluded after her research into
seemingly insigniﬁcant women’s groups in post-war Bosnia that : ‘ It
matters that these women’s organisations survive, because they are
potentially a social space (and a rare one) in which a genuinely trans-
formative progressive revisioning of the social might happen after cata-
strophic societal failure.’
A P R O C E S S A P P R O A C H T O P E A C E O R G A N I S A T I O N S
These everyday accounts of local organisations can be put into per-
spective by adopting a process approach to organisations. By doing
so, seemingly unrelated and mundane incidents of quarrelling women,
and misunderstandings between donors and local groups, can be
understood as part of the dynamics by which the wheeling and dealing
of peacebuilding acquires meaning. To elaborate this approach, we
identify ﬁve central properties of organisations. We shall discuss each of
them in view of the presented cases and bring out what lessons can be
learnt.
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Organisations are an amalgam of diﬀerent pedigrees
Though NGOs the world over look remarkably like each other and
are obviously modelled on some international standard, they also reﬂect
national, historical and cultural conditions (Tvedt 1998). NGOs and
other organisations are the outcome of complicated processes and mani-
fest locally grown organising patterns and state–society relations. SWVP
and the Narus group went through several transformations that
profoundly changed their meaning. SWVP moved from a membership
organisation, with a Nairobi-based constituency and an important role for
the wives of factional leaders, to a women’s movement, and ﬁnally to an
NGO, mainly working in the countryside of southern Sudan, and with
some paid staﬀ. The Narus women group started as an informal social
network, turned into a platform for inter-ethnic dialogue, brought
together by outsiders, and ﬁnally became a mutual support group. When
dealing with organisations in peacebuilding, it is thus wise to take into
account their history and trace where they come from, and not restrict
our interest in these organisations to how they operate in the context of
conﬂict and peace (Bakewell 1999).
Organisations have multiple identities
Organisations are made up of people who have multiple identities. The
SWVP women are committed peace activists, but at the same time they
are women struggling with their own traumatic experiences from war,
living in displacement and as providers for their families. These multiple
identities are reproduced in the organisation, which represented for the
women a peacebuilding organisation just as much as a venue to meet
other women and a prospective livelihood. While people shape organ-
isations, inconsistencies between the lifeworld of organisational actors
and the objectives of the organisation can easily occur. Narus women’s
dependence on brewing alcohol, for example, prevented the organisation
from campaigning against alcohol, even though they were aware that
alcohol was a major factor in local violence.
In general, the identity of an NGO is added to other forms of formal or
informal organisation. Often, being a peace organisation is added on to
other activities. Taken on as a temporary or marginal focus, this often
leads to organisational crisis, when actors after some time start to question
if and how this must become their core identity. All formal forms of
organisation are, at the same time, social networks. These may coincide
with the organisation, but more often organisations comprise diﬀerent
social networks, each of which is stretched beyond its original conﬁnes.
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This makes the boundaries of organisations much less clear than appears
on paper. How for instance should one delineate the women’s networks
in Narus, which linked up with diﬀerent donor projects and appeared as
separate organisations (with overlapping membership) in the reports of
diﬀerent agencies, each of which could claim to have successfully formed
a local group?
Obvious lessons from this are that international organisations have
to invest in gaining insight into these local dynamics, better coordinate
in supporting local groups, and tone down their expectations of what
local groups can achieve. A particular lesson can be derived from the
importance of social networks in organisations. In both cases, informal
social networks underlying the organisation provided more meaning,
stability and coherence than its formal objectives and activities. These
social networks tended to be single-ethnic in nature. In our view, this
ﬁnding questions the high premium put on building peace through
multiethnic organisations. The everyday running together of an
organisation requires a level of social proximity and trust, far exceed-
ing what is needed for a peaceful coexistence of groups in society, and
demanding multiethnic participation may create more harm than
good.
Organisations consist of multiple realities
There is no single answer to what an organisation is, what it wants and
what it does. Organisations typically hinge around diﬀerent discourses
that each play a role in the way in which the organisation derives its
meaning, and which are played out diﬀerently in diﬀerent domains.
A peacebuilding organisation may, for instance, simultaneously be a
vehicle for the political ambitions of its leaders, and fundraisers for
peace may in reality raise funds for warfare. The most notorious ex-
ample is Rwanda, where despite its extremely high civil society density,
genocide occurred partly because civil society actors turned out to
have stronger loyalties to their government and ethnicity than to their
principles (Uvin 2001). Rwanda stands out as the ultimate nightmare of
a naı¨ve support of civil society, but multiple realities of organisations
always exist and are usually more innocent, as in the case of service
NGOs whose informal objective is to generate job security for their
staﬀ.
SWVP was as much a peacebuilding organisation as a vehicle to
strengthen the position of women. The Narus group was a mutual support
group as well as a peacebuilding initiative. The diﬀerent discourses
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prevailing in NGOs are not necessarily a weakness : they can reinforce or
contradict each other. This is rarely the subject of reﬂection, and often
NGO people are not aware of these multiple realities. Creating
such awareness can help organisations to identify and resolve inherent
tensions.
Organisations are ‘decentred ’
Organisations do not derive their meaning only from their objectives and
workplans ; nor, contrary to popular belief, are they made by their leaders.
Recent organisation theory emphasises that organisations are ‘decentred’
(Nuijten 1998; Stacey et al. 2000). The meanings of organisations evolve
in practice, and result from the everyday negotiations of staﬀ members
and other stakeholders. All staﬀ members reﬂect on the meaning of the
organisation, the context in which they work, and the events that happen
around them. Through their everyday practices, they display particular
meanings of the organisation.
The diﬀerent expectations and interpretations between the core group
of SWVP and the more marginal members, as well as between SWVP
Nairobi and women groups like the one in Narus, all had repercussions
on how the organisations could function. This was exacerbated by
the way outsiders responded to these dynamics. DPO, for instance, in-
creasingly distanced itself from the Nairobi women and deliberately tried
to give the local chapters centre-stage, amongst other means through
ﬁnancial conditions. The meaning of organisations is thus also nego-
tiated by stakeholders around the organisation. No matter how well-
meaning organisations may be, in environments where mistrust and
rumours abound, they are highly liable to attract the reputation of being
partisan, rendering them ineﬀective as a consequence. One of numerous
examples is given in OECD (1997), where a peacebuilding radio pro-
gramme was considered partisan because the accent of the actors
identiﬁed them with one of the clans in the conﬂict. Such processes also
took place in Sudan. Women’s organisations considered single ethnic
by outsiders could hardly operate convincingly as peacebuilders. The
New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) constantly faced complications
because some outsiders deemed this organisation to be too close to
the rebel movement. The decentredness of organisations urges possible
supporting organisations to look beyond the contacts with management
representatives, and move into questions regarding the composition and
perceptions of staﬀ, and the images portrayed by the organisation to the
outside world.
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Organisations are political
Development policy often leans on the notion of civil society as value-
driven and a-political. However, often contrary to their appearance,
civil society organisations make ideological choices, and wittingly or
unwittingly play political roles. International organisations working in
conﬂict areas are usually well aware of this. As already noted, the question
of whether organisations are associated with rebel movements is a con-
stant concern. There are, however, also other political processes taking
place. Much of what organisations do is inspired by and aﬀects the power
politics of internally and externally controlling and allocating resources,
and the production of meaning, ideas and activities. This can be called
the everyday politics of organisations (cf. Kerkvliet 1991: 11). At the same
time, organisations are geared towards legitimation. In the case of NGOs,
this means that in order to ﬁnd clients and supportive stakeholders, they
have to convince others of their appropriateness and trustworthiness (cf.
Bailey 1971). In our case, it could be said that while DPO assumed
that SWVP was genuinely interested to expand its work inside southern
Sudan, the SWVPwas mainly playing the donor’s tune, as NGOs often do.
The diﬀerent kinds of politics intertwine in practice. When Sudanese
NGOs accuse each other of political involvement, they are actually
engaged in organisation politics to gain the upper hand in an NGO ﬁeld
competing for donors. It is important to realise that this politics operates
in international organisations as much as in local ones. INGOs need to
convince their back-donor of their trustworthiness, and back-donors need
to convince their governments and the public at large that they spend their
money in an eﬀective and accountable way. The fact that many INGOs
preferred to set up their own local groups rather than working through
existing groups is an instance of legitimation politics. INGOs, in order to
enhance their legitimation, often claim and aim to work in situations
where they initiate organisation.
Recognising these diﬀerent kinds of politics often helps in understand-
ing seeming incongruencies in organisations. This can work in diﬀerent
ways. Often, in development situations, organisations tend to ignore the
(ideological) political roles that NGOs play. In conﬂict situations, on the
other hand, international organisations tend to overplay the importance
of this kind of politics, falsely assuming that all organisation politics and
legitimation strategies stem from political diﬀerence around the conﬂict.
Although these ﬁve points can be generally applied to any organisation,
they are especially pertinent for peacebuilding organisations. Capacity
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building in (post-)conﬂict situations is a particularly complicated process,
because conﬂict often erodes civil society organisations, and because of
the diﬃculties of working in extremely resource-poor environments
(Harvey 1998). Another complication is found in the complex ﬁeld of
actors that emerges in conﬂict situations, both within the area and because
of the inﬂux of intervening international agencies. Finally, conﬂict or
transition situations lead to a lot of insecurity, where people have to
respond to unknown events and much of their knowledge is based not
on experience but on political manipulation and rumour.
: : :
What is the point of supporting civil society, in particular women’s
groups, to enhance peace in Sudan? When we look at the formal peace-
building processes of IGAD, we see that NGOs have very restricted access
to national or international negotiations. The limited role of women
in peacebuilding is bound up with the space for women to participate in
public aﬀairs. In many cases, cultural impediments and prejudices to
women’s political participation still prevail. Women are ignored or simply
‘ forgotten’. Although the involvement of women in the oﬃcial peace
process is slowly improving, mainly as the result of external inter-
ventions such as the Engendering the Peace project, most attention for the
role of women in peace is geared to their potential to forge peace at local
level.
As elaborated in the paper, we concur with the position that it is crucial
to support local (civil society) institutions that can make a diﬀerence
by resolving frictions without resorting to violence. Strengthening local
capacities for peace is crucial because, in the ﬁrst place, higher-level
conﬂict is always manifested locally in speciﬁc conﬂicts that need to be
resolved on the ground. In the second place, once peace is established and
international organisations withdraw from the scene, one needs resilient
local institutions that can absorb, alter or resolve future tensions. Now that
Sudan has entered a transition towards peace, such support is possibly
even more important, given the increased tensions that may be expected
once refugees start to return home, and the intensiﬁed resource com-
petition that will result from renewed development interventions.
However, it is not enough to blindly advocate building local capacities
for peace. Local-level peacebuilding should be grounded in the empirical
analysis of social and organisational processes. The paper has presented
a case of an INGO-supported Sudanese peace programme that turned
into a frustrating process, because of misgivings about the nature of
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the organisations involved. When the Sudanese organisation did not
live up to its promises, the Dutch agency (pressurised by its back-donor)
tried hard but was powerless to get the project delivered as envisaged.
The Sudanese organisation felt increasingly abandoned by the INGO
that showed little appreciation for its work. Most importantly, the project
largely failed. No wonder, perhaps, that many international organisations
shy away from these activities in southern Sudan, yet such a response
is unfortunate. In the long term, bypassing or ignoring local capacities is
simply no option when working on peacebuilding. When international
organisations are serious about peacebuilding, they have to make
more eﬀort to analyse the capacities of local organisations, to search for
gems among the rubble, and to sit down with organisations to dialogue
about the alleged problems. Moreover, in the case presented, the prob-
lems that occurred were partly induced by the donor agency that
projected its ambitions and views onto a local organisation. Taking
capacity building seriously will thus also require international organis-
ations to reﬂect on the extent to which problems are related to their own
culture and practices.
On the donor side, much of what went wrong in the project was
because the donor knew everything about conﬂicts in Sudan, but very little
about the nature of organisations. Peacebuilding is done by people, and
the dynamics in their organisation are crucial for the success of pro-
grammes. In this paper, we have forwarded a process approach to peace
organisations. Such an approach focuses on the question of how actors
in and around organisations give meaning to an organisation. A process
approach brings out ﬁve main properties of organisations :
$ Organisations are the outcome of their own social, individual and
institutional history, as well as their national, historical and cultural
context.
$ Organisations constitute social networks that often stretch beyond their
conﬁnes.
$ Organisations consist of diﬀerent realities and discourses that are used
strategically to manage relations, including relations with donors.
$ The meaning of an organisation results from everyday negotiations of
staﬀmembers and stakeholders.
$ Organisations are fundamentally political in nature; peace organis-
ations are not just involved in the politics of peace and conﬂict, but as
much in everyday politics of the production of meaning and the reallo-
cation of resources and in the politics of legitimation of their organisation
vis-a`-vis other stakeholders.
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Organisations, then, appear as entities which a bewildering numbers of
stories can be told about. Yet, there are a number of diﬀerent practical
implications of a process approach to organisations.
$ Organisation dynamics will not be unfolded by reading their reports,
talking with the director, or organising a single participatory work-
shop. Grasping the organisational dynamics of peacebuilding needs a
more in-depth or even ethnographic methodology, which can best be
achieved through co-ordinated research eﬀorts commissioned by the
diﬀerent international organisations with a presence in the area.
$ Adopting a process approach means accepting that there is no single
truth about organisations, but that insights depend on particular
interpretations. Methodologies for assessment, implementation and
evaluation must be adjusted to this insight and rely more on multi-
stakeholder dialogue than on so-called expert knowledge.
$ International organisations interested in capacity building of local
peace organisations must develop more sensitivity to the multiplicity
of discourses, and in particular pay attention to the informal aspects
of organisations and the perceptions of diﬀerent staﬀ (not just the
management).
$ International organisations have to realise that capacity building of
local organisations is a long-term process that needs serious commit-
ment. This is especially the case in conﬂict and post-conﬂict situations,
where civil society tends to break down. The depletion of local
resources, a lack of organisational capacities, and the environment
of suspicion in which civil society organisations have to grow, makes
organisation building in such situations complicated.
$ International organisations must be cautious in the kind of support
they extend to local peacebuilding processes. Supporting peacebuilding
requires recognising and respecting indigenous notions, processes and
time frames for organisational development.
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